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Abstract: In the last few years appeared pedagogical propositional natural deduction
systems. In these systems, one must satisfy the pedagogical constraint : the user must
give an example of any introduced notion. In formal terms, for instance in the propo-
sitional case, the main modification is that we replace the usual rule (hyp) by the rule
(p-hyp)
F ∈ Γ
(hyp)
Γ ⊢ F
F ∈ Γ ⊢ σ · Γ
(p-hyp)
Γ ⊢ F
where σ denotes a substitution which replaces variables of Γ with an example. This
substitution σ is called the motivation of Γ .
First we expose the reasons of such a constraint and properties of these “pedagogical”
calculi: the absence of negation at logical side, and the “usefulness” feature of terms at
computational side (through the Curry-Howard correspondence). Then we construct a
simple pedagogical restriction of the calculus of constructions (CC) called CCr. We es-
tablish logical limitations of this system, and compare its computational expressiveness
to Go¨del system T.
Finally, guided by the logical limitations of CCr, we propose a formal and general
definition of what a pedagogical calculus of constructions should be.
Key Words: mathematical logic, negationless mathematics, constructive mathemat-
ics, typed lambda-calculus, calculus of constructions, pedagogical system.
Category: F.1.1, F.4.1
1 Introduction and Motivations
1.1 The pedagogical constraint
Recently the articles [Colson and Michel(2007),Colson and Michel(2008),Colson
and Michel(2009)] appeared in print, introducing pedagogical natural deduction
systems and pedagogical typed λ-calculi. The main feature about these systems is
that any proof (or any program)must satisfy the so named pedagogical constraint:
in natural deduction systems (for instance) the rule (hyp) is replaced by (p-hyp)
F ∈ Γ
(hyp)
Γ ⊢ F
F ∈ Γ ⊢ σ · Γ
(p-hyp)
Γ ⊢ F
where σ denotes a substitution which replaces propositional variables of Γ
with an example, and ⊢ σ · Γ stands for the derivations of those substituted
formulas.
The idea of such a constraint is that, in order to assume a set Γ of hypotheses,
one must first provide a “motivation” (the substitution σ under consideration) in
which the set of hypotheses is fulfilled. In doing so, we can always exemplify intro-
duced hypotheses. This is the formal counterpart of the usual informal teaching
practice, consisting in giving examples of objects satisfying the assumed prop-
erties. This last point is a justification of the terminology pedagogical systems,
and the necessity of such a constraint was already observed by [Poincare´(1913)]
[see Section 3.1].
1.2 The pedagogical minimal propositional calculus
In [Colson and Michel(2007)], the minimal propositional calculus over→, ∨ and
∧ has been constrained as previously explained. It is shown in the article that
the resulting calculus (P-MPC) is equivalent to the original one: a judgment
Γ ⊢ F is derivable in the usual system (MPC) if and only if it is derivable in its
pedagogical version (P-MPC).
1.3 The pedagogical second-order propositional calculi
The case of the second-order propositional calculus (Prop2) is considered in
[Colson and Michel(2008)]. Constraining only the rule of hypothesis as above,
one is led to a weakly pedagogical second-order calculus (Ps-Prop
2), where rules
dealing with quantification are the usual ones:
Γ ⊢ F α 6∈ V(F )
(∀i)
Γ ⊢ ∀α.F
Γ ⊢ ∀α.F
(∀e)
Γ ⊢ F [α← U ]
The same remark as above holds for this calculus, but it is not stable by
normalization of proofs. Indeed, it is shown that ⊥ → ⊥ is derivable in Ps-
Prop2 (where ⊥ stands for ∀α.α):
1. β ⊢ β (β is motivable)
2.⊢ β → β (→i 1)
3.⊢ ∀β.β → β (∀i 2)
4.⊢ ⊥ → ⊥ (∀e 3)
But a normal form of this proof must end with a (→i) rule of ⊥, which is
impossible since ⊥ is not motivable. Hence the normal form of this proof is not
a proof of Ps-Prop
2.
This motivates the more constrained system P-Prop2 where the (∀e) rule has
been replaced by
Γ ⊢ ∀α.F ⊢ σ · U
(P-∀e)
Γ ⊢ F [α← U ]
It is shown about this system that the usual second-order encoding of con-
nectives ∨ and ∧ essentially works but it must be observed that the ∨i (at right
for instance) becomes:
Γ ⊢ A ⊢ σ · B
(∨ir)
Γ ⊢ A ∨B
The main result concerning P-Prop2 is that there exists a translation F 7→ F γ
inspired by the A-translation of [Friedman(1978)] such that: Γ ⊢ F is derivable
in Prop2 if and only if Γ γ ⊢ F γ is derivable in P-Prop2.
1.4 The pedagogical second-order λ-calculus
Through the Curry-Howard isomorphism, previous work about second-order
propositional calculus is extended in [Colson and Michel(2009)] to the second-
order λ-calculus. The system is shown to be stable by reduction (i.e. enjoys the
so-called subject reduction property). An important feature for a λ-calculus is
defined: the usefulness of functions. It means that every typable function in this
pedagogical λ-calculus can be applied to a term: if ⊢ f : A→ B, then there is a
substitution σ such that σ ·A is inhabited. Indeed, pedagogical λ-calculi do not
allow one to write useless programs, which are not needed.
1.5 The calculus of constructions
The calculus of constructions (CC) has been first introduced in [Coquand and
Huet(1984),Coquand(1985)]: it is a λ-calculus which encompasses higher-order
λ-calculi and calculi with dependent types. It is then natural to extend previous
works on “pedagogization” to CC in the aim of obtaining a uniform treatment
of pedagogical λ-calculi.
1.6 Organization of the article
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we recall usual notations for
the calculus of constructions (CC); in section 3 we introduce the main criterion
for a subsystem of CC to be pedagogical, we discuss about the impossibility
of a straightforward modification of CC, and we propose a better one; then in
section 4 we show that this restriction meets this criterion; we present some
limitations of it at logical and computational side in sections 5 and 6; finally we
conclude by the first formal definition of a pedagogical subsystem of CC.
2 Background and Notations
In this section, we briefly recall usual definitions and notations about the calculus
of constructions CC.
We try to use x, y, .. as symbols for variables, u, v, w, t, .. to denote terms,
and A,B, .. for types and formulas.
≡ is the syntactical equality of terms 1. We note by  β the usual beta-
reduction relation between terms;
∗
 β its reflexive and transitive closure; and
=β its equivalence closure. V(t) is the set of free variables of t. t is said to
be closed if V(t) = ∅. t[x ← u ] is the usual substitution of u for x in t; and
t[x1, .., xn ← u1, .., un ] is the simultaneous substitution of u1 for x1, u2 for x2,
etc. To shorten notations, we use a vector symbolism: ~t denotes the sequence of
terms t1, .., tn; and ∀~x
~A.B denotes ∀xA11 ..∀x
An
n .B.
There are two kinds of judgments: Γ wf means that the environment Γ is
syntactically well-formed, and Γ ⊢ t : A expresses that the term t is of type
A in the environment Γ . Implicitly Γ ⊢ A : κ signifies that there exists κ ∈
{Prop,Type} such that this previous statement holds. Γ ⊢ t : A : κ is the
contraction of Γ ⊢ t : A and Γ ⊢ A : κ. As usual, A→ B is a shortcut notation
for ∀xA.B when x does not appear in B.
Rules of CC are presented in [Fig. 1]: a close presentation can be found
in [Bunder and Seldin(2004)] (without the well-formed judgment), or in [Co-
quand(1986),Barendregt(1992)].
Beta-reduction is known to be confluent and terms of this calculus to be
strongly normalizing [Barendregt(1992)].
In the sequel we shall need the following elementary results (proofs in [Co-
quand(1985),Barendregt(1992)]):
Lemma1. If Γ wf holds, then Type 6∈ Γ (the constant Type never appears in
any well-formed environment). And if Γ ⊢ t : A holds, then Type 6∈ Γ ∪ {t}.
Lemma2. If Γ ⊢ t : A holds, then A ≡ Type or Γ ⊢ A : κ.
Proposition3. (i) If Γ, x : A,Γ ′ wf and Γ ⊢ u : A hold, then Γ, Γ ′[x← u ] wf
also holds.
(ii) If Γ, x : A,Γ ′ ⊢ t : B and Γ ⊢ u : A hold, then Γ, Γ ′[x ← u ] ⊢ t[x ← u ] :
B[x← u ] holds.
1 As in [Coquand(1989)], we assume De Bruijn indexes for bound variables and iden-
tifiers for free variables. So there is no need for α-conversion notion.
(env1)
[ ] wf
Γ ⊢ A : κ x 6∈ V(Γ )
(env2)
Γ, x : A wf
Γ wf
(ax)
Γ ⊢ Prop : Type
Γ, x : A,Γ ′ wf
(var)
Γ, x : A,Γ ′ ⊢ x : A
Γ, x : A ⊢ u : B : κ
(abs)
Γ ⊢ λxA.u : ∀xA.B
Γ, x : A ⊢ B : κ
(prod)
Γ ⊢ ∀xA.B : κ
Γ ⊢ u : ∀xA.B Γ ⊢ v : A
(app)
Γ ⊢ u v : B[x← v ]
Γ ⊢ t : A Γ ⊢ A′ : κ A =β A
′
(conv)
Γ ⊢ t : A′
where κ stands for Prop or for Type.
Figure 1: Inference rules of CC
3 Pedagogizing CC
3.1 The Poincare´ criterion
Let us recall the necessity of the pedagogical constraint —here in the case of
definitions by postulate— by the following quotation:
A definition by postulate has value only when the existence of the
object defined has been proved. In mathematical language, this means
that the postulate does not imply a contradiction, we do not have the right
to neglect this condition. Either it is necessary to admit the absence of
contradiction as an intuitive truth, as an axiom, by a kind of act of faith
—but then it is necessary to realize what we are doing and to remember
that we have extended the list of indemonstrable axioms— or else it is
necessary to construct a formal proof, either by means of examples or by
the use of reasoning by recurrence. Not that this proof is less necessary
when a direct definition is involved, but it is generally easier.
Henri Poincare´ – Last thoughts [Poincare´(1913)]
In CC, a definition by postulate of an object xmay be seen as an environment
containing x followed by hypotheses about x. For instance,
Let x be a natural number verifying P (x) and Q(x).
is formally represented in CC by the following environment
x : N, H1 : P (x), H2 : Q(x)
Poincare´ pointed out that such a set of hypotheses is an admissible definition
by postulate of x only if we are able to exhibit a natural satisfying both predicates
P and Q. In other words, types P (x) and Q(x) must be inhabited for a given x
(say n) in CC. Namely the following statements must hold:
⊢ n : N ⊢ t1 : P (n) ⊢ t2 : Q(n)
If this is not possible (i.e. there is no such n, t1 or t2) then the definition is
meaningless and should be avoided.
Let us generalize to any environment:
Definition 4 (Poincare´ criterion). The environment x1 : A1, .., xn : An is
respectful of the Poincare´ criterion only if there exists terms t1, .., tn such that
the following judgments are derivable:
⊢ t1 : A1
⊢ t2 : A2[x1 ← t1 ]
...
⊢ tn : An[x1, . . . , xn−1 ← t1, . . . , tn−1 ]
A formal system is said to meet the Poincare´ criterion only if every well-
formed environment are respectful of the Poincare´ criterion.
3.2 On the naive extension of previous work
In the previous works on pedagogization [see section 1], each environment is
motivated before being used. It is then immediate that each used environment
can be motivated, hence such a system trivially satisfies the Poincare´ criterion.
Unfortunately such a simple adjustment can not be performed into CC.
The straightforward extension of the previous work to CC can be summed
up by the following changes:
– remove (env1) and (env2) rules;
– replace (ax) and (var) rules by these ones:
σ · Γ
(ax)
Γ ⊢ o : ⊤ : Prop : Type
σ · (Γ, x : A,Γ ′)
(var)
Γ, x : A,Γ ′ ⊢ x : A
where
– σ is the substitution [x1 7→ t1; . . . ;xn 7→ tn] when Γ ≡ x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An,
and σ · Γ denotes the judgments:
⊢ t1 : A1
⊢ t2 : A2[x1 ← t1 ]
...
⊢ tn : An[x1, . . . , xn−1 ← t1, . . . , tn−1 ]
– o and ⊤ are two added constants in order to be able to begin derivations
(like in [Colson and Michel(2009)]).
In this subsection, we refer to this system as P , and index its judgments by p.
P is not a subsystem of CC:
Lemma5. The following derivations hold in P but not in CC:
(a) x1 : Type ⊢p Prop : Type
(b) x1 : Prop, x2 : (λH
⊤→x1 .⊤) (λy⊤.y) ⊢p Prop : Type
(c) x1 : N, x2 : (λH
x1=0.⊤) (λPN→Prop.λHP 0.H) ⊢p Prop : Type
Proof. Proofs that derivations hold in P are trivial as soon as we exhibit a
motivation:
(a) σ1 := [x1 7→ Prop]
(b) σ2 := [x1 7→ ⊤;x2 7→ o]
(c) σ3 := [x1 7→ 0;x2 7→ o]
And it is easy to see that they are not derivable in CC:
(a) Type appears into an environment, which is forbidden in CC [see lemma 1];
(b) (λH⊤→x1 .⊤) (λy⊤.y) is ill-typed since the function waits for a element of
type ⊤ → x1, but an element of type ⊤ → ⊤ is given instead;
(c) same reason as for (b): the function waits for a proof of x1 = 0, whereas a
proof of 0 = 0 is passed.
⊓⊔
Remark. Those examples involve dependent types. It seems that this naive ex-
tension can work for λω [see [Michel(2008)]].
Remark. The first case can be avoided by enforcing the Ai to be of type Prop
or Type in the definition of σ · Γ .
CC has the advantage that well-formed types are built into the system. So
we just need to find which rules need to be constrained and how in order to
avoid not motivable types (i.e. empty types).
3.3 A simple attempt: CCr
In CC, we are able to introduce ⊥ := ∀AProp.A as an hypothesis if we have
been able to derive ⊥ as a type, which is allowed by the (prod) rule. Actually,
the (prod) rule is the only one able to create vacuity, since other rules construct
types and an inhabitant of it simultaneously. We then impose products to always
be inhabited by replacing the usual (prod) rule of CC by the following more
restrictive one:
Γ, x : A ⊢r t : B : κ
(prodr)
Γ ⊢r ∀x
A.B : κ
This rule may be condensed together with (abs) to obtain a rule with two con-
clusions. So the resulting calculus can be viewed as CC without the (prod) rule.
From now on we will refer to the resulting calculus as CCr, whose judgments
will be indexed by r.
Usual properties of CC from [Coquand(1985)] still hold for this calculus,
especially substitution (prop.3 above), weakening and the well-known “subject
reduction” (stability by reduction). These were formally checked in the Coq
proof assistant by straightforward adaptation of the work in [Barras(1996)].
Example of derivation in CCr
Lemma6. The following rule is derivable:
Γ wfr
Γ ⊢r o : ⊤ : Prop
where o := λAProp.λxA.x and ⊤ := ∀AProp.A→ A.
Proof.
1. Γ wfr (hyp)
2. Γ ⊢r Prop : Type (ax 1)
3. Γ, A : Prop wfr (env2 2)
4. Γ, A : Prop ⊢r A : Prop (var 3)
5. Γ, A : Prop, x : A wfr (env2 4)
6. Γ, A : Prop, x : A ⊢r x : A : Prop (var 5)
7. Γ, A : Prop ⊢r λxA.x : A→ A : Prop (abs+prod 6)
8. Γ ⊢r λA
Prop.λxA.x : ∀AProp.A→ A : Prop (abs+prod 7)
4 CCr meets the Poincare´ criterion
In this section we show that every type (term of sort Prop or Type) in a well-
formed environment of CCr is inhabited. A sketch of the proof is: we first notice
that in CCr every product is inhabited, then, because each closed type reduces
to a product, we can inhabit every type of a well-formed environment (beginning
by its leftmost type, which is closed).
Lemma7. If Γ ⊢r ∀xA.B : T holds, then there exists κ and a term t such that
Γ ⊢r t : ∀xA.B and T =β κ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation: if the last used rule is (prod) then we
build t by (abs) rule, and if it is (conv) then we apply induction hypothesis to
get t. ⊓⊔
Lemma8. If Γ ⊢r B : Type holds, then there exists a term t such that Γ ⊢r t : B
is derivable.
Proof. By cases on the last applied rule; (ax) case is dealt with lemma 6; (var),
(app) and (conv) cases are eliminated using lemmas 1 and 2; (prod) case is trivial
using (abs) rule. ⊓⊔
Indeed, every element of type Type is syntactically of the form ∀~x
~A.Prop, and
then trivially inhabited by λ~x
~A.⊤.
Lemma9. If Γ ⊢r B : ∀~x
~A.Prop holds with B closed, then for all closed terms
w1, . . . , wn verifying
Γ ⊢r w1 : A1
Γ ⊢r w2 : A2[x1 ← w1 ]
...
Γ ⊢r wn : An[x1, . . . , xn−1 ← w1, . . . , wn−1 ]
there exists a term t such that
Γ ⊢r t : B ~w
Proof. Let us define by ‖t‖ the length of the longest path of reduction from
the term t to its normal form (which exists because terms of CCr are strongly
normalizing).
We proceed by induction on the lexicographical order of ‖B ~w‖ and the
height of the derivation of Γ ⊢r B : ∀~x
~A.Prop.
Let us deal with non-trivial cases (others being mostly eliminated by lem-
mas 1 and 2):
(abs) If the last rule of the derivation is
Γ, x1 : A1 ⊢r u : ∀x
A2
2 . . . ∀x
An
n .Prop : Type
Γ ⊢r λx
A1
1 .u : ∀~x
~A.Prop
Let ~w be the above closed terms.
Substituting v for x1 in the premise, we obtain (property 3)
Γ ⊢r u[x1 ← w1 ] : ∀x
A2[x1←w1 ]
2 . . . ∀x
An[x1←w1 ]
n .Prop
As ‖u[x1 ← w1 ] w2 .. wn‖ < ‖(λx
A1
1 .u) w1 w2 .. wn‖, and u[x1 ← w1 ] is
closed (since λxA11 .u and w1 are), we can apply induction hypothesis to built a
term t such that Γ ⊢r t : u[x1 ← w1 ] w2 .. wn from which by (conv) rule we
finally get
Γ ⊢r t : (λx
A1
1 .u) ~w
(app) If the last rule of the derivation looks like
Γ ⊢r u : ∀y
C .∀~x
~D.Prop Γ ⊢r v : C
Γ ⊢r u v : ∀~x
~D[y←v ].Prop
where ~A ≡ ~D[y ← v ] and B ≡ u v.
Let ~w be the above terms. Since for every i xi 6∈ V(v), so
Di[y ← v ][x1, .., xi−1 ← w1, ..wi−1 ] ≡ Di[y, x1, .., xi−1 ← v, w1, ..wi−1 ]
Noticing we have ‖u v ~w‖ = ‖(u v) ~w‖, we can then apply induction hypothesis
of the first premise on the terms v, ~w to obtain t such that
Γ ⊢r t : (u v) ~w
(conv)
Γ ⊢r B : T Γ ⊢r ∀~x
~A.Prop : Type T =β ∀~x
~A.Prop
Γ ⊢r B : ∀~x
~A.Prop
By lemma 2 on Γ ⊢r B : T , we have three cases: T ≡ Type, Γ ⊢r T : Prop or
Γ ⊢r T : Type. By confluency, the definition of beta-reduction, the properties of
subject reduction and uniqueness of types, only Γ ⊢r T : Type remains. Hence
T must be of the form ∀~x
~C .Prop where ~A =β ~C.
Let ~w be the above terms. In order to apply induction hypothesis on the first
premise, it is necessary to show that
Γ ⊢r w1 : C1
Γ ⊢r w2 : C2[x1 ← w1 ]
...
Γ ⊢r wn : Cn[x1, . . . , xn−1 ← w1, . . . , wn−1 ]
First let us notice that since ~A =β ~C, then for each i Ai[x1, .., xi−1 ← v1, .., vi−1 ]
is convertible with Ci[x1, .., xi−1 ← v1, .., vi−1 ]. Also, because Γ ⊢r ∀~x
~C .Prop :
Type, for each i there exists κ such that Γ, x1 : C1, .., xi : Ci ⊢r Ci+1 : κ.
We can then proceed by induction on n:
1. Γ ⊢r w1 : A1 (hyp)
2. Γ ⊢r C1 : κ
3. A1 =β C1
4. Γ ⊢r w1 : C1 (conv 1 2 3)
5. Γ ⊢r w2 : A2[x1 ← w1 ] (hyp)
6. Γ, x1 : C1 ⊢r C2 : κ
7. Γ ⊢r C2[x1 ← w1 ] : κ (prop.3 4 6)
8. A2[x1 ← w1 ] =β C2[x1 ← w1 ]
9. Γ ⊢r w2 : C2[x1 ← w1 ] (conv 5 7 8)
...
Finally, we apply induction hypothesis of the first premise on those now
well-typed ~w to get a term t satisfying
Γ ⊢r t : B ~w
⊓⊔
The two previous lemmas can be summed up by the following statement:
Corollary 10. If Γ ⊢r B : κ holds with B closed, then there exists a term t such
that Γ ⊢r t : B.
So the pedagogical character of the calculus follows, every type of a well-
formed environment is inhabited:
Theorem 11 (Poincare´ criterion). If x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An wfr holds, then
there exists terms t1, . . . , tn such that
⊢r t1 : A1
⊢r t2 : A2[x1 ← t1 ]
...
⊢r tn : An[x1, . . . , xn−1 ← t1, . . . , tn−1 ]
Proof. By induction on the size of the environment n.
From the derivation x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An wfr, we have ⊢r A1 : κ as a sub-
derivation where A1 is closed. So by corollary 10, we get t1 such that
⊢r t1 : A1
Then by property 3 we have x2 : A2[x1 ← t1 ], . . . , xn : An[x1 ← t1 ] wfr. By the
same way, we construct t2 such that
⊢r t2 : A2[x1 ← t1 ]
and then x3 : A3[x1, x2 ← t1, t2 ], . . . , xn : An[x1, x2 ← t1, t2 ] wfr.
...
⊓⊔
This so named “motivation” may be transmitted to the conclusion of judg-
ments:
Corollary 12. If x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ⊢r u : B holds, then there exists terms
t1, . . . , tn such that
⊢r t1 : A1
⊢r t2 : A2[x1 ← t1 ]
...
⊢r tn : An[x1, . . . , xn−1 ← t1, . . . , tn−1 ]
and
⊢r u[~x← ~t ] : B[~x← ~t ]
Proof. Immediate by applying n times the property 3 using the terms obtained
from the theorem. ⊓⊔
Theorem 13 (usefulness). If ⊢r f : ∀xA.B holds, then there exists a term u
such that ⊢r u : A.
Proof. From ⊢r f : ∀xA.B, by lemma 2 we have ⊢r ∀xA.B : κ, then x : A ⊢r B : κ
which implies that x : A wf, and finally by theorem 11 we construct u. ⊓⊔
5 Limitations of the logical power of CCr
To introduce an hypothesis (which is not a variable) in an environment, it is
necessary to first inhabit it. For instance, defining Leibniz equality over a type
A by
x =A y := ∀Q
A→Prop.Q x→ Q y
it is not possible to prove nor symmetry nor transitivity of this relation over
A (whatever this type is). Indeed, because we are not permitted to derive A :
Prop, x : A, y : A ⊢r x =A y : Prop, we can not introduce x =A y as an hypothesis
and then we are not allowed to use it.
Theorem 14. There is no term u such that ⊢r u : ∀A
Prop.∀xA.∀yA.x =A y →
y =A x holds.
Proof. Let us suppose such a term u exists. So we have a sort κ such that
A : Prop, x : A, y : A ⊢r x =A y : κ. And because x =A y is a product,
by lemma 7, it is inhabited, say by t. But since CCr is a restriction of CC,
A : Prop, x : A, y : A ⊢ t : x =A y also holds in CC. Then, applying it to N and 0
and 1, we get a proof of 0 = 1 in the empty environment in CC, which is known
to be impossible (by a simple combinatoric discussion about the normal form of
such a term). ⊓⊔
In fact, this calculus does not even natively contain simply typed λ-calculus:
Theorem 15. There is no term u such that
A B C : Prop ⊢r u : (A→ B)→ (B → C)→ (A→ C)
holds.
Proof. Using same arguments as above, if such a u exists, then the following
judgment holds:
A : Prop, B : Prop, C : Prop ⊢r A→ B : Prop
so there is an inhabitant t of the product type A→ B in CCr and hence in CC,
implying by (abs) rule that
⊢ λABCProp.t : ∀ABCProp.A→ B
which can be specialized to ⊤ and ⊥ to obtain a proof of ⊤ → ⊥ and finally a
proof of ⊥ in the empty environment, which is impossible since CC is consistent.
⊓⊔
Actually, every instances of the types in CCr must be inhabited:
Theorem 16. If x1 : A1, .., xn : An ⊢r B : κ holds, then for all terms w1, . . . , wn
such that
⊢r w1 : A1
⊢r w2 : A2[x1 ← w1 ]
...
⊢r wn : An[x1, . . . , xn−1 ← w1, . . . , wn−1 ]
there exists a term t such that
⊢r t : B[~x← ~w ]
Proof. The proof is trivial by applying n times the substitution property 3, ob-
taining ⊢r B[~x← ~w ] : κ, inhabited by corollary 10. ⊓⊔
It is hard to precisely determine the logical expressiveness of CCr. We have
at least simply typed λ-calculus on closed (and then inhabited) types of CCr
(e.g. ⊤, N, etc.). The proof is the same as the one of lemma 21 below.
6 Computational expressivity of CCr
Although the logical strength of CCr seems quite poor, its computational power
is at least that of the Go¨del system T. We use the usual well-known way to
define terms, types (except cartesian product), and recursor (from iterator) of
system T in lambda-calculus (see [Girard et al.(1990)]).
Definition 17.
N := ∀AProp.A→ (A→ A)→ A
0 := λAProp.λxA.λfA→A.x
S(n) := λAProp.λxA.λfA→A.f (n A x f)
itT (n, b, (y
T )step) := n T b (λyT .step)
Lemma18. The following rules are derivable:
Γ wfr
Γ ⊢r 0 : N : Prop
Γ ⊢r n : N
Γ ⊢r S(n) : N
Γ ⊢r T : Prop Γ ⊢r n : N Γ ⊢r b : T Γ, y : T ⊢r step : T
Γ ⊢r itT (n, b, (y
T )step) : T
Lemma19. The following reductions hold:
itT (0, b, (y
T )step)
∗
 β b
itT (S(n), b, (y
T )step)
∗
 β step[y ← itT (n, b, (y
T )step) ]
Definition 20 (simple types on N). Simple types on N are those obtained
from N and →.
Lemma21. If Γ wfr holds and T is a simple type on N, then there exists a term
t such that Γ ⊢r t : T : Prop.
Proof. By induction on T (as a simple type on N):
– If T is N, then 0 fits.
– If T is A → B where A and B are simple types on N, then by induction
hypothesis on A, we get Γ ⊢r A : Prop and by (env2) rule we obtain Γ, x :
A wfr. By induction hypothesis onB, we get Γ ⊢r b : B : Prop, and weakening
it we have Γ, x : A ⊢r b : B : Prop, and finally, by (abs) and (prod) rules,
Γ ⊢r λx
A.b : A→ B : Prop.
⊓⊔
CCr does not allow us to derive the usual cartesian product defined by A×
B := ∀CProp.(A→ B → C) → C. To simulate recursor from iterator, we define
a restricted cartesian product N× T for each T , simple type on N, by encoding
a natural into T .
Lemma22. If Γ wfr holds and T is a simple type on N then there exists two
terms encT and decT such that Γ ⊢r encT : N → T and Γ ⊢r decT : T → N and
for every term n we have decT (encT n)
∗
 β n.
Proof. By induction on T (as a simple type on N):
– If T is N, then we take the identity on N for encT and decT .
– If T is A→ B, we take
encA→B := λx
N.λzA.encB x
decA→B := λf
A→B.decB (f a)
where a is a term of type A obtained from lemma 21.
⊓⊔
Definition 23. We define the following abbreviations for couples
N× T := (T → T → T )→ T
〈n, t〉T := λfT→T→T .f (encT n) t
π1(c) := decT (c (λx
T .λyT .x))
π2(c) := c (λx
T .λyT .y)
Lemma24. The following rules are derivable:
Γ wfr
Γ ⊢r N× T : Prop
Γ ⊢r n : N Γ ⊢r t : T
Γ ⊢r 〈n, t〉
T : N× T
Γ ⊢r c : N× T
Γ ⊢r π1(c) : N
Γ ⊢r c : N× T
Γ ⊢r π2(c) : T
Lemma25. The following reductions hold:
π1(〈n, t〉T )
∗
 β n
π2(〈n, t〉T )
∗
 β t
Definition 26. We define recursor from iterator by
recT (n, b, (x
N, yT )step) := π2
[
itT×T (n, 〈0, b〉
T , (zT×T )step′)
]
where
step′ := 〈S(π1(z)), step[x, y ← π1(z), π2(z) ]〉
T×T
Lemma27. The following rule is derivable:
Γ ⊢r T : Prop Γ ⊢r n : N Γ ⊢r b : T Γ, x : N, y : T ⊢r step : T
Γ ⊢r recT (n, b, (x
N, yT )step) : T
Lemma28. The following reductions hold:
recT (0, b, (x
N, yT )step)
∗
 β b
recT (S(n), b, (x
N, yT )step)
∗
 β step[x, y ← n, recT (n, b, (x
N, yT )step) ]
7 Conclusions and direction for further work
We have seen a simple attempt to pedagogize the calculus of constructions.
It has a good computational power —at least Go¨del system T— but lacks of
logical expressivity —does not even natively contain simply typed λ-calculus. A
pleasant aspect is the simplicity of the added constraint, which also emphasizes
that the (prod) rule is responsible for vacuity in CC.
Logical limitations of our calculus CCr suggest a more precise definition for a
calculus of constructions to be pedagogical: in a pedagogical calculus, we should
be able to prove the symmetry of the Leibniz equality, because the non-emptiness
of x =A y can be justified by substituting N to A and 0 to x and y. It means that
we not only need that a well-formed environment guarantees the non-emptiness
of its types by exhibiting an example, but the converse should hold too.
But as it was already pointed out in section 3.2, the direct converse statement
of the Poincare´ criterion is not suitable. We then propose the following definition
of a pedagogical subsystem of CC (whose judgments are indexed by p):
Definition 29 (pedagogical subsystem of CC).
P is a pedagogical subsystem of CC if:
1. x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An wfp holds if and only if
(a) x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An wf holds in CC,
(b) and there exist terms t1, . . . , tn such that
⊢p t1 : A1 : κ1
⊢p t2 : A2[x1 ← t1 ] : κ2
...
⊢p tn : An[x1, . . . , xn−1 ← t1, . . . , tn−1 ] : κn
2. the system is stable by reduction, namely if Γ ⊢p u : B and u  β u′, then
Γ ⊢p u′ : B.
Remark. 1. The left to right side of the equivalence is already known as “the
Poincare´ criterion”, and enforces P to be a subsystem of CC. The right to
left side should then be named “the converse of the Poincare´ criterion”.
2. The subject reduction must be explicitly stated here since [Colson and
Michel(2008)] defined a “simple pedagogical second-order propositional cal-
culus (Ps-Prop2)” verifying 1 but not 2.
One can show, keeping only the rules of CC necessary to define second order
λ-calculus and adding constraints of the pedagogical second order λ-calculus
of [Colson and Michel(2009)], that we obtain a calculus which is pedagogical
in the new sense just defined. For instance, P-MPC et P-Prop2 [see section 1]
satisfy: it exists F such that Γ ⊢ F if and only if it exists σ such that ⊢ σ · Γ .
By the same way, we can construct more expressive pedagogical restrictions of
CC: a hint is given by [Michel(2008)] where he studies pedagogical propositional
higher order systems. It thus raises the question of formally characterizing a
maximally expressive pedagogical restriction of CC.
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